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COMMENT
Trade Secret Law and the Changing Role of
Judge and Jury
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,' appear to have changed substantially the standard by which
courts review motions to dismiss at the pleadings stage. In these two decisions,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that judges should scrutinize pleadings
thoroughly to weed out plaintiffs bringing unmeritorious suits. Although this
revised standard was set forth in Twombly, the 2009 Iqbal decision was
probably more significant. Since Twombly involved the relatively complex and
specialized field of antitrust, it was initially unclear whether the Court intended
to extend its holding elsewhere. Iqbal answered that question, confirming that
the Court intends the new standard to apply to litigation in other areas.'
Judges, in other words, have been put on notice to be more aggressive about
throwing out claims of all types at the pleadings stage.
Although Iqbal settled that issue, it left others in its wake. One particularly
important question is whether the Court's new attitude about motions to
dismiss holds significance beyond the pleadings stage. Read broadly, the
Court's recent decisions indicate a changing attitude about the allocation of
authority between judge and jury. The Court has not addressed whether this
changing judicial role should be limited to the pleadings stage. In Twombly and
Iqbal, the Court indicated that judges should dismiss more cases at the earliest
stages of trial. A reasonable extension of this view would be that judges should
also be more aggressive about dismissing unmeritorious claims as litigation
progresses.
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2oo7).
2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. See infra notes 23-24, 28-30 and accompanying text.
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If judges are going to be more critical of unmeritorious plaintiffs, then this
Comment suggests that the law governing intellectual property - specifically
that of trade secrets-would be a good place to start. While the Supreme Court
has made no recent statements regarding summary judgment and trade secret
law, the circuit courts generally have held that judges should be quite hesitant
to dismiss plaintiffs' trade secret claims at the summary judgment stage. This
attitude has contributed to costly litigation that is open to abuse by
unmeritorious litigants. Since concern about the costliness of unmeritorious
suits has been the primary motivating factor for the Court's recent shift,4 trade
secret doctrine is especially in tension with the current Court's views on the
role of the judge. This Comment thus argues that judges in trade secret cases
should be more willing to dismiss claims than in the past.
The Supreme Court's recent rulings regarding intellectual property suggest
that the Court is, generally speaking, interested in the allocation of authority at
the summary judgment stage in this area of law. Furthermore, abusive
litigation in intellectual property is particularly troublesome, allowing wealthy
holders of property to deter less wealthy individuals with the mere threat of
litigation.
1. THE STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TRADE SECRET
LAW
Trade secret law has been acknowledged by both commentators and courts
as extraordinarily important to the modern American economy.s The doctrine
protects against the misuse of confidential business or technical information by
unfair or unreasonable means.6 The doctrine is implicated when confidential
information is misappropriated by means of theft or a breach of a duty of
confidentiality. When an owner of information successfully brings suit for a
violation of trade secret law against those who use the information improperly,
4. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
s. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (noting "the importance
of trade secret protection to the subsidization of research and development and to increased
economic efficiency"); Reingold v. Swiftships Inc., 210 F.3d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting
"the importance of state trade secrets law to interstate business"); United States v.
Aleynikov, No. io Cr. 96 (DLC), 2010 WML 3489383, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010) (noting
"the increasing importance of intangible assets like trade secrets in the high-technology,
information age" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 4-7
(1996)); Gale R. Peterson, Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 Hous. L. REv. 385, 386-87
(1995) (explaining the importance of trade secrets for securing property rights).
6. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE




courts award the owner damages and/or injunctions against future use or
disclosure.' In order to qualify for this protection, however, the trade secret
owner must show that it possesses valuable information and has taken
reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of the secret.
In practice, trade secret claims are considered particularly onerous for
litigants, because the inquiry is especially fact-intensive. This fact-intensiveness
is true of intellectual property cases generally, as the matters being litigated
tend to be complex and technical.8 As a result, it is notoriously hard for
defendants to have intellectual property cases resolved at the summary
judgment stage, as such cases almost always present at least an arguable issue
of material fact after discovery.9
The nature of the inquiry in trade secret law also makes such claims
particularly difficult for the defense. In most jurisdictions, whether
information qualifies as a trade secret is determined by a multipronged,
factually intensive test.'o Furthermore, to demonstrate that their use of the
information was legally appropriate, defendants typically must make a showing
not about their own behavior, but about the other party's failure to take
reasonable steps to protect the trade secret." The standard of "reasonableness"
is especially contingent on facts because the judgment as to whether additional
precautions would have been so costly as to be unreasonable will vary
according to the value of the secret being protected." If judges are reluctant to
exercise their own judgment at the summary judgment stage, then there will
often be a factual dispute sufficient to warrant a trial.
In light of this fact-based inquiry, judges have set an especially high bar for
summary judgment in trade secret cases. The textbook citation for the standard
comes from Judge Posner in Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries,
7. Id. at 28.
8. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 531 (2003).
g. See, e.g., 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
5 32:120 (2010) (discussing various circuits' approaches to summary judgment in trademark
cases); see also Robert C. Nissen, The Art of the Counterclaim, INTELL. PROP., May 7, 2001, at
64 (discussing the difficulty of litigating patent cases).
10. See, e.g., Sw. Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1189 (loth Cir. 2009); Doeblers' Pa.
Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3 d 812, 829 (3 d Cir. 2006).
n1. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 244 (1998).
12. See i ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.04, at 1-3o8.20 (20o8); see also,
e.g., Elmer Miller, Inc. v. Landis, 625 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that what
constitutes "reasonable steps" will vary).
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Inc." Rockwell Graphics, a manufacturer of printing press parts, filed suit
against competitor DEV, alleging that the defendant could only have produced
similar parts with Rockwell's diagrams detailing the method of manufacture, a
trade secret. 14 DEV countered with evidence that Rockwell had routinely
supplied copies of manufacturing diagrams to subcontractors and had made
little effort to get these copies back or to limit further copying, undermining
Rockwell's claim that it took reasonable precautions to keep the information
secret." The district court judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment,
finding that Rockwell presented contrary evidence only in a "transparent
attempt to create a chimerical issue of fact." 6 According to Judge Posner, even
this minor factual dispute was enough to preclude summary judgment:
"[0] nly in an extreme case can what is a 'reasonable' precaution be determined
on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a
balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case."" The court
thus remanded the case back to the district court for trial.
Courts in other circuits have adopted Rockwell Graphics-like standards and
have been firm in overruling district courts that are too aggressive in
dismissing cases." As a result, so long as there is some evidence that the
plaintiff tried to keep the information secret, the issue is considered one "for
the jury"-making summary judgment all but impossible.' 9
II. THE COURT'S REALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN JUDGE
AND JURY
For fifty years, courts were instructed to review pleadings under the very
lenient standard of Conley v. Gibson."o Under Conley, a complaint "should not
13. 925 F.2d 174 (7 th Cit. 1991).
14. Id. at 175-76.
15. Id. at 177-78.
16. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
17. Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 179.
18. See, e.g., Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., 543 F. 3 d 294 (6th Cit. 2008); AT&T Commc'ns of Cal.,
Inc. v. Pac. Bell, No. 99-15668, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23215 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2000). But see
Tubos de Acero de Mex., S.A. v. Am. Int'l Inv. Corp., 292 F.3d 471, 485 (5th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing trade secret claims at summary judgment because plaintiffs "limited attempts,
if any, at secrecy do not amount to reasonable effort").
19. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F-3d 714 , 725 (7th Cit. 2003).
20. See 5 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:




be dismissed .. . unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.""
Now, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that judges should
scrutinize pleadings more thoroughly. In Twombly, the Court emphasized that
judges should examine the "plausibility" of the claims made in the complaint
and require plaintiffs to allege specific facts in support of their arguments for
liability.- In Iqbal, the Court explained that a court should check for
plausibility at the pleadings stage by "draw[ing] on its judicial experience and
common sense."2 3
Technically, the Iqbal and Twombly decisions have no direct relevance to the
law of summary judgment because they deal with the earlier pleadings stage of
litigation. However, a court newly invigorated to cut down on unmeritorious
lawsuits might not stop at the pleadings stage. The underlying reason for
emboldening judges to dismiss claims at the early stages of litigation suggests
no stark distinction between summary judgment and motions to dismiss. The
Court has long cited protecting defendants from the cost of unnecessary
litigation as a primary purpose of summary judgment. 4 In its most recent
cases, the Roberts Court has relied on this same rationale-the cost of
litigation-for altering the motion to dismiss standard. In Twombly, Justice
Souter emphasized how "expensive" litigation can be in the antitrust context
and worried that this expense "will push cost-conscious defendants to settle
even anemic cases."" Likewise, Justice Kennedy stressed the importance of the
"expenditure of valuable time and resources" due to litigation in Iqbal.2
Because increased attentiveness to the high cost of litigation has motivated the
Court to adopt a stricter standard at the pleadings stage, it raises the possibility
that courts might be similarly encouraged to be more aggressive at the
summary judgment stage.27
21. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
22. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
23. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
24. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (citing concerns about
"unwarranted consumption of public and private resources").
25. 550 U.S. at 559.
26. 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
27. Iqbal provides strong evidence that the Court intends to alter permanently the motion to
dismiss standard. 129 S. Ct. at 1959-60 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing Court's
treatment of Twombly). But see Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner,
J.) (suggesting that the context of Iqbal, a suit against high-ranking government officials, is,
like antitrust, somewhat "special").
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On the other hand, to the degree that Twombly reflected concerns
exclusively about discovery, there may not be cause to extend the reasoning of
those cases to summary judgment, which occurs after discovery is complete.
The Iqbal case, however, sows doubt about that conclusion. The Court
recognized that discovery in that case would be "minimally intrusive," but
overriding concerns about the cost of frivolous litigation nonetheless persuaded
the Court to dismiss the claim. This suggests that the Court is less concerned
with expensive discovery per se than with potentially abusive litigation more
generally.28
Indeed, beyond their effect on motions to dismiss, these two most recent
cases are arguably just as significant for what they say about the Justices' views
on the role of judge and jury generally. The opinions may reflect a fairly
revolutionary step-away from "liberal" civil procedure focused on ensuring
access to courts and toward civil procedure concerned with the protection of
defendants from plaintiffs via aggressive judging.29 At least one scholar has
suggested that Twombly be construed "not so much as a pleading decision but
rather as a court access decision." 3o
On the whole, it is too soon to tell if Twombly and Iqbal have broad
implications for civil procedure generally or if their impact will be limited to
motions to dismiss. If, however, we are to take the Court at its word, then areas
of law in which litigation costs are most problematic would be a logical place to
extend the Court's rulings.
III.SPECIAL RELEVANCE OF RECENT CASES TO TRADE SECRET LAW
Encouraging judges to dismiss more trade secret cases at summary
judgment would be consistent with the Court's recent precedent. As several
commentators have noted, abusive trade secret litigation is considered
particularly onerous."
One area of great concern is the strategic use of trade secret litigation by
companies against employees who leave to form competing businesses." These
28. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
29. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 185 (2010).
30. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 873, 876 (2009).
31. See Bone, supra note 11, at 272-79.
32. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and




lawsuits have the potential to stifle innovation and growth in the American
economy by dampening employee mobility."
Furthermore, the abuse of these lawsuits by former employers may be
particularly effective against companies focused on emerging technologies. A
company engaging in technological innovation will find it especially easy to
generate an unmeritorious lawsuit against a former employee because its
business model makes use of an abundance of information that has value
precisely because it is unknown to competitors.14 Even if the former employee
did not have access to a particular piece of information, an employer can
generate an abusive suit that is difficult to disprove immediately." The mere
threat of a successful trade secret lawsuit often is enough to kill a successful
start-up, as the prospect of a suit can cut off the supply of venture capital. 6
There is substantial evidence suggesting that such litigation has inhibited the
growth of new technologies and corresponding economic growth in certain
regions of the country. 7
Beyond the specific situation of companies and their former employees,
most businesses dealing with some element of modern technology have much
to fear from trade secret litigation. The threat is present whenever one
company has an agreement to use the technology of another for a limited
period of time." When such an agreement terminates, the contract typically
stipulates that the company will cease using the technology altogether.
However, so long as the company remains in business and continues to market
products, it is often at least arguable that the company is still making use of the
formerly licensed technology in some fashion. 9 In the modern economy, few
technology companies of any size can operate without relying on some
technologies generated by other companies. As one intellectual property trade
33. See Bruce Alan Kugler, Limiting Trade Secret Protection, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (1988).
34. See Charles T. Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and Non-Competition Laws
Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 323, 338 (20o6).
35. See id. at 339.
36. See Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for
Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAw. 887, 900 (1998); Alexander E. Silverman, Intellectual
Property Law and the Venture Capital Process, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 157, 159-60 (1990).
37. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594-619 (1999).
38. See Jay Dratler, Trade Secret Law: An Impediment to Trade in Computer Software, 1 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 44-52 (1985) (describing uncertainty in trade secret
litigation regarding computer software and its implications for software licensing).
39. See Richard Linn & Michael D. Bednarek, US Trade Secrets-An IP Manager's Guide, 47
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 38, 41 (1995).
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publication states, "[I] t is almost inevitable that some trade secret problems
will arise."4o
In addition to the potential for abuse, there is also ample evidence that
trade secret claims are especially costly to litigate, a factor that the Court cited
in Twombly and Iqbal and that Judge Posner himself has highlighted in
commentary on these pleadings cases." The fact-intensive nature of the trade
secret inquiry means that the parties must bring a particularly sizable amount
of evidence. For example, unlike in real property, for which the boundaries are
relatively clear, the scope of what constitutes confidential information is almost
always at issue in a trade secret claim.42 And, of course, the relative infrequency
of judicial intervention, beyond encouraging unmeritorious claims to extort
settlements, makes the cases that do proceed more expensive, as they are much
more likely to drag on to final resolution by a jury than to be handled earlier by
a judge.
Finally, for reasons similar to those cited above, defendants may have
significant incentives to settle even unmeritorious trade secret lawsuits. The
substantial uncertainty about the outcome of trade secret suits due to the fact-
sensitive nature of the inquiry may push defendants toward settlement rather
than to risk a negative result.43 This phenomenon may be exacerbated by the
fact that lenders may be unwilling to put forth capital until all claims are
resolved. 4 Notably, the Court emphasized concerns about unfairly forced
settlements in Twombly. 45
IV. HOW TRADE SECRET LAW MIGHT FOLLOW OTHER AREAS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
There are already signs that the standard for summary judgment in
intellectual property cases is beginning to change at the Court's behest. In both
40. Id.
41. Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cit. 2009) (Posner, J.).
42. See Steven N.S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 49-50
(1982).
43. See Miles J. Feldman, Comment, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade
Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH L.J. 151, 171 (1994) (noting that
"companies do not lnow where they stand with respect to potential liability" in trade secret
cases).
44. See Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 8o KY. L.J. 565, 590-91 (1992).
45. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) ("[T]he threat of discovery expense





the trademark and patent contexts, the Court has recently encouraged judges to
be more aggressive in dismissing unmeritorious claims on summary judgment.
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc."* has been widely hailed as the most
significant patent case in a generation for substantively changing the doctrine
of "obviousness."4 7 However, in addition to the substantive shift, the Court
also made a significant procedural alteration to summary judgment: whereas in
the past the question of obviousness had been treated as a matter of fact for the
jury to resolve, the Court suggested that judges should make the obviousness
ruling as a matter of law. 8
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.49 indicated a similar change in
the trademark arena. While the case introduced a substantive change in the law
regarding what should be considered "distinctive" for the purpose of
trademark protection, the case was also important for indicating that this
determination should be made by a judge at the summary judgment stage.o in
so ruling, the Court cited the (by-now) common refrain about defendants
being harmed "not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of
successful suit."" Indeed, beyond the shift in intellectual property doctrine,
KSR and Samara Brothers may be significant, but underappreciated, as a sign
that the Court's more restrictive attitude toward civil procedure has already, in
fact, been extended beyond the pleadings stage. Trade secret law, this
Comment has argued, would be a particularly good area for this trend to
continue.
To reduce the incentive for abusive trade secret suits, courts would not
need to alter the substantive doctrine. Rather, courts would simply follow the
model of KSR and Samara Brothers, shifting the allocation of decisionmaking
authority between judge and jury. When the parties largely agree about what
precautions the holder of the trade secret took to keep the information
confidential, judges should be willing to decide, as a matter of law on summary
judgment, whether those precautions were reasonable enough to warrant trade
secret protection rather than leaving the reasonableness determination to trial.
46. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
47. See, e.g., Justin Lee, How KSR Broadens (Without Lowering) the Evidentiary Standard of
Nonobviousness, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 34 (20o8).
48. KSR, 550 U.S. at 426-27; see Meng Ouyang, Note, The Procedural Impact of KSR on Patent
Litigation, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 158, 159-61 (2009).
49. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
50. Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use, 5o
Aluz. L. REV. 157, 159 n.1o (20o8); see also Meurer, supra note 8, at 531-32.
51. 529 U.S. at 214.
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Of course, in some cases the facts will be sufficiently disputed that summary
judgment will remain impossible.
Applying this standard to the Rockwell Graphics case is instructive. There,
the defendant presented "ample evidence of dissemination" of the information
in question.s2 Even though Rockwell presented a small amount of testimony to
the contrary, the "essentially uncontradicted evidence" undermined Rockwell's
contention that the information was a sufficiently guarded trade secret." The
court of appeals should simply have accepted the district court judge's
determination that the factual dispute was "chimerical"s4 and allowed her to
dismiss the claim. A judge should have the authority to dismiss a claim with
nearly - albeit not entirely - undisputed facts, even if the plaintiff can arguably
generate some contention.
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF PROCEDURE IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
The identities of the parties, as well as the nature of the claims, in Twombly
and Iqbal made the tint of those decisions politically conservative. Twombly was
an antitrust case filed by plaintiff consumers against telecommunications
corporations, while Iqbal was a constitutional tort claim filed by a person
detained by the federal government on terrorism-related grounds. It is perhaps
not surprising then that the substantive doctrinal shift indicated by those
cases - that judges should use "common sense and experience" to dismiss bad
suits-has been criticized as reflecting the interests and biases of wealthy
elites."
Interestingly, however, the shift toward more restrictive procedure in
intellectual property cases would probably have the opposite effect. Plaintiffs
most likely to abuse intellectual property litigation are "big fish" companies
trying to maintain market share.56 Whereas many abusive lawsuits target deep-
pocketed defendants from whom plaintiffs seek to extort settlement, the threat
of litigation itself may enable large corporations to bully start-ups in
intellectual property cases. Likewise, to the extent that employers use trade
secret litigation to prevent the mobility of individual employees, more
52. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D. 111. 1990).
s3. Id.
54. Id.
55. Spencer, supra note 29, at 201.




restrictive procedure would favor less wealthy individuals over corporate
interests.
Shifting intellectual property doctrine would thus be an opportunity for the
Court's conservative majority to demonstrate that their concern is with the fair
application of law regardless of the identity of the parties. In any case, it would
be unwise for those who have voiced such opposition to Twombly and Iqbal to
be similarly hostile to a shift in trade secret law. Such a change would do a lot
of good.
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